简述治理（governance）概念。

正确答案：
(ii) Control weakness
ISA 260 contains guidance on the type of issues that should be communicated. One of the matters identified is a control
weakness in the capital expenditure transaction cycle. The assets for which no authorisation was obtained amount to
0·3% of total assets (225,000/78 million x 100%), which is clearly immaterial. However, regardless of materiality, the
auditor should ensure that the weakness is brought to the attention of the management, with a clear indication of the
implication of the weakness, and recommendations as to how the control weakness should be eliminated.
The auditor is providing information to help those charged with governance improve the internal systems and controls
and ultimately reduce business risk. In this case there is a high risk of fraud, as the lack of authorisation for purchase
of office equipment could allow expenditure on assets not used for bona fide business purposes.
Disagreement with accounting treatment of brand
Audit procedures have revealed a breach of IAS 38 Intangible Assets, in which internally generated brand names are
specifically prohibited from being recognised. Blod Co has recognised an internally generated brand name which is
material to the statement of financial position (balance sheet) as it represents 12·8% of total assets (10/78 x 100%).
The statement of financial position (balance sheet) therefore contains a material misstatement.
The report to those charged with governance should clearly explain the rules on recognition of internally generated brand
names, to ensure that the management has all relevant technical facts available. In the report the auditors should
request that the financial statements be corrected, and clarify that if the brand is not derecognised, then the audit opinion
will be qualified on the grounds of a material disagreement – an ‘except for’ opinion would be provided. Once the breach
of IAS 38 is made clear to the management in the report, they then have the opportunity to discuss the matter and
decide whether to amend the financial statements, thereby avoiding a qualified audit opinion.
Audit inefficiencies
Documentation relating to inventories was not always made readily available to the auditors. This seems to be due to
poor administration by the client rather than a deliberate attempt to conceal information. The report should contain a
brief description of the problems encountered by the audit team. The management should be made aware that
significant delay to the receipt of necessary paperwork can cause inefficiencies in the audit process. This may seem a
relatively trivial issue, but it could lead to an increase in audit fee. Management should react to these comments by
ensuring as far as possible that all requested documentation is made available to the auditors in a timely fashion.

正确答案：1.参与原则
参与原则是民主的政治治理的基本原则参与包含几个关键要素:投权,基层自治，对话协商。
2.透明原则
透明原则是公共治理的重要标准之一.透是指政府在制定决策，执行决策过程中的绝大多数信息都要向公众公开，公众可以通过合法的，便利的途径在法定时间内获取所需的信息透明原则包括信息公开与程序公开。
3.责任原则
责任原则是公共治理的核心，而重中之重是强调公共机构的责任.公共治理的责任内涵:积极的，建设性的责任负面的，惩罚性的责任。

参考答案：隐患治理实行分级治理、分类实施的原则。主要包括岗位纠正、班组治理、车间治理、部门治理、公司治理等。 隐患治理应做到方法科学、资金到位、治理及时有效、责任到人、按时完成。并保证整改措施、责任、资金、时限和预案“五到位”。能立即整改的隐患必须立即整改，无法立即整改的隐患，治理前要研究制定防范措施，落实监控责任，防止隐患发展为事故。

答案：罗西瑙

答案：

解析：

正确答案：
(c) Corporate governance provisions varying by country
There is a debate about the extent to which corporate governance provisions (in the form. of either written codes, laws or
general acceptances) should be global or whether they should vary to account for local differences. In this answer, Vincent
Viola’s view is critically evaluated.
In general terms, corporate governance provisions vary depending on such factors as local business culture, businesses’
capital structures, the extent of development of capital funding of businesses and the openness of stock markets. In Germany,
for example, companies have traditionally drawn much of their funding from banks thereby reducing their dependence on
shareholders’ equity. Stock markets in the Soviet Union are less open and less liquid than those in the West. In many
developing countries, business activity is concentrated among family-owned enterprises.
Against Vincent’s view
Although business cultures vary around the world, all business financed by private capital have private shareholders. Any
dilution of the robustness of provisions may ignore the needs of local investors to have their interests adequately represented.
This dilution, in turn, may allow bad practice, when present, to exist and proliferate.
Some countries suffer from a poor reputation in terms of endemic corruption and fraud and any reduction in the rigour with
which corporate governance provisions are implemented fail to address these shortcomings, notwithstanding the fact that they
might be culturally unexpected or difficult to implement.
In terms of the effects of macroeconomic systems, Vincent’s views ignore the need for sound governance systems to underpin
confidence in economic systems. This is especially important when inward investment needs are considered as the economic
wealth of affected countries are partly underpinned by the robustness, or not, of their corporate governance systems.
Supporting Vincent’s view
In favour of Vincent’s view are a number of arguments. Where local economies are driven more by small family businesses
and less by public companies, accountability relationships are quite different (perhaps the ‘family reasons’ referred to in the
case) and require a different type of accounting and governance.
There is a high compliance and monitoring cost to highly structured governance regimes that some developing countries may
deem unnecessary to incur.
There is, to some extent, a link between the stage of economic development and the adoption of formal governance codes.
It is generally accepted that developing countries need not necessarily observe the same levels of formality in governance as
more mature, developed economies.
Some countries’ governments may feel that they can use the laxity of their corporate governance regimes as a source of
international comparative advantage. In a ‘race to the bottom’, some international companies seeking to minimise the effects
of structured governance regimes on some parts of their operations may seek countries with less tight structures for some
operations.